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THE STRIKE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Last summer six hundred and fifty Sanitation, Works and
Safety Department employees walked off their jobs in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, in a disagreement over pay raises and benefits.
The strike, which halted various municipal services, including
garbage collection, street cleaning, and street repair,1 was eas-
ily squelched when the mayor fired four hundred and twenty
workers who did not return to work by an announced deadline.
He declared that the workers who violated the conditions of the
existing contract and defied the courts had no right to continue
in their jobs while flaunting legal authority.2 In Lexington,
Kentucky, firemen struck to dramatize their desire for union
recognition even though the Fayette Circuit Court had pre-
viously issued a restraining order enjoining them from partici-
pating in any work stoppages. The strike resulted when the
metropolitan government refused to recognize Local 526 of the
Professional Fire Fighters Association as a collective bargain-
ing agent for the contract formulation process.' Stating that
"[t]hey've (local firemen) done all they could short of a strike
to gain recognition for the union and collective bargaining,"4 a
union representative categorized the use of the walkout as a
last resort to achieve the firemen's demands. All across the
country in the fall of 1973 schools were closed because the
teachers, protesting for improved salaries and working condi-
tions, failed to return to the classroom. More than thirty com-
munities nationwide were affected, with 175,000 students gain-
ing an extended summer vacation in Michigan and Pennsyl-
vania alone.'
The public services involved in these work stoppages were
varied; the effects upon the populace widespread. Nearly all of
the strikes were illegal, either statutorily prohibited or judi-
cially proscribed. In spite of the illegality of the work stoppages
I Louisville Courier-Journal, June 7, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
2 Louisville Courier-Journal, June 8, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
Lexington Herald, Aug. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
Lexington Herald, Aug. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
Lexington Leader, Sept. 5, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
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and at the risk of considerable negative consequences, the pub-
lic employees persisted in their strike activity.
Recent years have spawned an increasing number of public
employee work stoppages, as well as the participation of larger
numbers of the public servants in the strikes. The strikes have
also become widespread geographically, now frequently involv-
ing workers in the South and Midwest as well as those in the
North, East, and West. Earlier strikes among public employees
occurred primarily in the large urban areas, particularly New
York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Chicago and the
major cities of California have also experienced public
employee strikes. These cities have been the traditional sites
for many initiatives in the labor movement, as well as other
sociological and economic developments which later gained
general acceptance. Now, however, the public employee strike
has reached areas traditionally slow in adopting new ideas and
reluctant to emulate the practices of the more "radical" East-
ern urban population.
This sudden increase in public employee strikes is a cu-
rious phenomenon, especially in light of the severe penalties
that are universally imposed for such illegal work stoppages.
However, it may well be that "[tihe punitive and overly-rigid
repressive laws were counter-productive. Rather than promot-
ing labor peace by helping to improve labor relations and pre-
vent strikes, the laws encouraged labor unrest and strikes and
served to fuel the uncertainty."' The employees either ignore
or overlook the harsh penalties applicable to their conduct and
pursue the strike as a means of accomplishing their demands.
Often, one of the bargaining demands advanced as a condition
of settlement of the strike and resumption of work is a blanket
amnesty or pardon for the strikers' illegal conduct. When the
employees achieve this goal, the penalties are circumvented
and rendered nugatory.
7
Coupled with the undermining of the penalties designed to
prevent the use of strikes as bargaining weapons in public em-
I Haemmel, Government Employees and the Right to Strike, 39 TEN. L. Rav. 75,
83 (1972).
7 Following the sanitation strike in New York the penalties of the Condon Wadlin
Act were not enforced because prosecution had been waived as a condition of settle-
ment. Taylor, Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REv.
617, 618 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
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ployment are several external factors which have stimulated
the upsurge in public employee organization and strikes. The
evolving structure of the American social order is one such
factor: "The spread of organization among public employees
is . . . a reflection of a more general tendency in our society
to form groups in order to augment the force of individual
demands by concerted action."" In addition, the apparent suc-
cess of civil rights groups has prodded greater militancy in
public employees during the 1960's and 1970's.1 Perhaps an
even greater influence in stimulating the recent public
employee strikes were earlier ventures in the same areas.
[T]he demonstrated success of initial illegal strikes such as
the New York transit strike and some early teachers' strikes
became powerful proof that the power to strike was of far
greater relevance than the right to strike. As long as some
employees obtained improvements from the strike, others
recognized it as a useful vehicle for their protest as well.10
Finally, the growing conviction that the attainment of desired
results warrants a flirtation with legal sanctions, together with
the thrill or excitement of "tasting of the forbidden fruit," has
added to the forces dictating resort to the strike.
These external factors, nevertheless, would not have been
sufficient stimuli for public employees to engage in illegal
strikes if conditions within the public employment realm were
not ripe for conflict. Historically, government employment was
more prestigious, rewarding and secure than work within pri-
vate enterprise. Of course, the nature of public service differed
considerably from that of private industry. Two significant
developments emerged from the New Deal era, however, to
alter the comparative relationship between public and private
employment. The great expansion in services performed by the
government and the diversification in the nature of the work
brought civil service more parallel to private business. "This
growing overlapping of activities in the public and private sec-
tors has been accompanied by a convergence in organizational
Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. Rzv. 931 (1969).
Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv.
459, 460 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein].
,0 Zack, Impasses, Strikes and Resolutions in PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBuc UNIONS
101, 102 (S. Zagoria ed. 1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Zack].
[Vol. 63
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structure. . . . [I]t has become difficult for many government
employees to distinguish their position from their counterparts
in the private sector."" Occurring at the same time as the
expansion of government services were the concerted efforts at
unionization among private employees and the growth of labor
organizations as a result of the national policy enunciated in
the Wagner Act. Workers in private enterprise were rapidly
organizing, and with unionization came the attendant in-
creases in wages and benefits and improvements in working
conditions.
Until recently, government leaders resisted any efforts to
unionize public employees; in fact, most states prohibited
organizational activities among their employees. Early organi-
zation of public employees was not done systematically and
resulted in a "crazy-quilt pattern of representation"'" which
has contributed to the growing incidence of public strikes. The
few states that initially permitted public employee organiza-
tion failed to provide organizational rights, which left the pub-
lic servants with no effective alternative to the strike when they
were organized. Indeed, the employer refused to deal with
them. 4 Besides refusing to grant organizational rights such as
collective bargaining, state and local governments failed to
maintain a parity with the private sector in regard to salaries
and benefits. Therefore, the right to organize became an empty
privilege, forcing the employees to strike. The strike ban was
but an ineffective deterrent, simply an obstacle to be disre-
garded while seeking to achieve employment demands. 5
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Essential to understanding the resort to the strike among
public employees is a grasp of the function that strikes play in
labor relations. A strike may be defined in numerous ways, at
" Herman, Strikes by Public Employees: The Search for "Right Principles", 53
Cm. B. Rac. 57, 60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Herman].
"i See generally 2 S. MORIMON, H. S. COMMAGEI & W. LEUCHTENBERG, THE GROWTH
OF THE AMmucAN R'uBsuc 471 (1969).
" Clark, Public Employee Strikes: Some Proposed Solutions, 23 LAB. L.J. 111, 112
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
" Krinsky, Avoiding Public Employee Strikes-Lessons from Recent Strike
Activity, 21 LAB. L.J. 464 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Krinsky].
1 Herman, supra note 11, at 65.
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some times broadly and at others narrowly, but a fairly repre-
sentative and inclusive definition of a strike, in the present
context, is:
• ..the failure to report for duty, the willful absence from
one's position, the stoppage or deliberate slowing down of
work, or the withholding, in whole or in part, of the full,
faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment,
for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change
in the conditions, compensation, rights, privileges or obliga-
tions of State employment .... 11
From this definition, numerous characteristics of the device
can be elicited. First, a strike is a mechanism of labor designed
to bring force, inducement, influence or coercion upon the em-
ployer in order to alter the conditions of employment and to
shift the relationship between employer and employee. Fur-
ther, it is generally used with collective bargaining in order to
equalize the relative strength of the parties. Normally the em-
ployee is in a weak position, since he must continue work in
order to obtain funds to provide his necessities. On the other
hand, the employer is in a position of strength and dominance,
since he usually has the vast labor pool from which to fill va-
cant jobs. The opportunities for alternative employment are
ofttimes scarce, whereas the supply of potential workers may
be great. Operating from this position, the employer can dic-
tate the terms and conditions of employment to meet his con-
venience when the employees are not organized.
In contrast, when employees are organized, pressure can
be brought upon the employer to accede to labor demands
through the vehicle of a concerted work stoppage. Advocates of
the power to strike often take the position, and rightly so, that
true collective bargaining depends upon a balanced power rela-
tionship between the parties, and that without the strike public
employees do not have sufficient power with which to obtain
bargaining leverage.17 Thus, "[t]he absence of the right to
strike in the great majority of jurisdictions has permitted the
employer to bargain with the assurance that if his offer is not
, GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1302 (1971).
,T Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 943, 948 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
[Vol. 63
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acceptable, the employees are legally prohibited from asserting
the same economic pressure as might their private sector
counterparts."' 8
Apart from the balancing of power, strikes, along with the
employer work stoppage equivalent (lockout), serve an impor-
tant function in allowing the parties to impose the cost of dis-
agreement on each other.'" When the parties cannot agree and
refuse to compromise, the cessation of work affects the expecta-
tions and needs of both sides. The employer is injured when
services terminate, and the nonpayment of wages naturally
harms the employee. Thus, each side has a loss resulting from
its recalcitrance. In addition, each side eventually has to alter
its stance in order to reach agreement. It is in this behavior
modification that the strike generates its effectiveness: "The
beauty of the strike is that while a potent weapon, it also in-
flicts damage on the wielder, so that even the threat of its use
induces in both sides the degree of reasonableness essential to
realistic bargaining."
20
The vitality and validity of the strike have been histori-
cally tested and proven by the experiences in private industry.
Prior to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act'
[hereinafter referred to as NLRA], which legalized the strike
as a labor bargaining tool, management had been for the most
part successful in refusing to grant meaningful rights and bene-
fits to employees. Since the passage of the NLRA, labor has
made great advances in establishing reasonable and safe work-
ing conditions at adequate pay by the use of the power to strike
to exact concessions from employers. The strike as an economic
weapon has achieved a permanent status in the private sector
of labor relations. While the years have witnessed an evolving
recognition and dependence upon the necessity of the private
strike, the vehement and firm rejection of this weapon within
public labor relations has not subsided. Indeed, the opposition
to a relaxation of the strike ban in the public sphere has re-
mained doggedly adamant.
This resistance lies to a great extent in the differences
" Zack, supra note 10, at 105.
" Herman, supra note 11, at 61.
21 Bernstein, supra note 9, at 463.
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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between public services and private business. Admittedly, the
nature of the products involved is different, and the effects of
strikes within each sector are of varying degree.
In the private sector, employers sell a product for which there
are generally adequate alternative sources of supply. The
purpose of a private sector strike is to bring economic pres-
sure on the employer by depriving the employer of sales and
profits. On the other hand, in the public sector the employer
provides a service which is often free of charge, and for which
there is generally no immediately available alternate source
of supply. Because the service is paid for by tax revenues, a
public sector strike generally does not affect the receipt of
revenue. Rather than bringing economic pressure on the em-
ployer, the purpose of a strike in the public sector is to bring
political pressure on the public employer, the pressure being
generated by the recipients of the public service which is
halted by the strike. 22
The services affected by a public employee strike are both cru-
cial to the smooth functioning of society, as exemplified by the
public transportation system, and vital to the health, safety
and general welfare of the community, as illustrated by the
sanitation, police and fire departments, public schools and wel-
fare disbursement offices. Due to their widely disseminated
impact upon our way of life, work stoppages in these essential
services are immediately apparent and obviously threatening
to the maintenance of social order. On the other hand, strikes
in private industry are generally more delayed in their impact
upon the public. Even though the families of striking workers
are directly affected by the lost or reduced income, they are
able to continue their everyday functions. Eventually, the pub-
lic may feel the crunch of lessened production through in-
creased prices resulting from the decreased supply. Generally,
however, the consequences of a private industry strike are not
nearly as drastic or pervasive as those experienced in a public
strike.
The proscription of strikes by public employees is dictated
by a consideration of several principles. First, public services
are of such an essential character that they must be continued.
2 Clark, supra note 13, at 115-16 (footnotes omitted). The author concludes that
there is no functional justification for permitting strikes by public employees.
[Vol. 63
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Second, price flexibility is an economic concept inapplicable to
the public sector. Third, the procedure to raise taxes or to find
new sources of revenue, reposed in the legislative body, is slow
and not sufficiently responsive to meet the immediate de-
mands imposed by striking public employees.?
Arising out of the background of the above mentioned
principles are several key distinctions between the nature and
effect of public and private strikes. Public strikes are generally
shorter than those of the private sector. This brevity may be
due to the fact that since public strikes are generally illegal, the
resort to the judicial process has terminated such strikes. Fur-
thermore, public pressure for early settlement is substantially
greater because of the broader and more immediate impact
upon society. Also, government employers are usually more
responsive to such public opinion and accede to the employees'
demands in order to avoid the significant political conse-
quences of a long strike. Likewise, union officials, cognizant of
negative public reaction, usually exercise greater restraint in
calling and continuing the strikes due to the serious conse-
quences of affecting vital services.
24
Another key distinction is that the economic motivation is
far less significant in public strikes than in private sector work
stoppages. In private industry the loss of sales resulting from
decreased output lowers profits and thus undermines the basis
of the free enterprise and competitive system. Public strikes,
on the other hand, do not affect the revenue collected but do
result in lower wage outputs. Thus, from an economic stand-
point, public strikes result in a favorable budget balance. Pres-
sure to terminate the strike is not economic but instead is
political, emanating from citizen expression for the resumption
of needed public services.?
Finally, a factor affecting the ability to rapidly and suc-
cessfully reach agreement and terminate the strike is the de-
gree of diffusion of responsibility within the two sectors. Public
employer authority and responsibility are widely diffused. In
fact, the legislative arm has responsibility for budgetary appro-
2 Witt, The Public Sector Strike: Dilemma of the Seventies, 8 CAL. WEST. L. REV.
102 (1972).
24 J. STIEBEE, Puuc EMPLOYEE UNIONISM 171 (1973).
2 Bemstein, supra note 9, at 464.
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priations necessary to fulfill employee demands, whereas the
executive has authority in the negotiation process and adminis-
tration of the dispersal of the services. Contrasted with this
lack of a unified structure is private industry, which is charac-
terized by a close-knit organization with an apparent centrali-
zation of decision-making power which permits a reasonably
rapid and decisive resolution of the disagreement with the
employee unions.26
III. JUDICIAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASES FOR
PUBLIC STRIKE PROHIBITION
The differences in the nature of services and goods pro-
vided by the public and private productive sectors, in the con-
sequencds emanating from strikes, and in the ability to cope
with and settle work stoppages in light of democratic philoso-
phies have formed the framework for the theories and reasons
propounded to uphold the prohibition of strikes by public em-
ployees. Both the courts and commentators have developed
rationales to buttress their arguments for denying public em-
ployees the strike power. As would be expected, some of these
reasons are fundamentally sound; others seem to be merely
manipulations of rhetoric designed to justify a continuation of
the traditional approach to the issue.
A. Sovereignty Theory
Perhaps the most frequently articulated reason for pro-
scribing the public employee strike is that it is an attack upon
the sovereignty of the government. Founded in the ancient, but
now waning, maxim- "The King can do no wrong"-this ra-
tionale once received great favor. Recently, however, it has
slipped in prominence as its conceptual source has also dimin-
ished." The clearest, and most often quoted, capsulization of
26 Id. at 465.
' The comments concerning the special trust and obligations of public employees
included in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's letter to Luther Stewart, President of
the National Federation of Federal Employees, reflect this sovereignty theory, once so
prevalent among the governing individuals and institutional leaders of this country.
Upon employees in the Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole
people, whose interests and welfare require orderliness and continuity in the
[Vol. 63
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this theoretical argument is the explanation in Norwalk Teach-
ers' Association v. Board of Education,2 where the court
stated:
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the peo-
ple. They can delegate it to a government which they create
and operate by law. They can give to the government the
power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish
certain services. The government so created and empowered
must employ people to carry on its task. Those people are
agents of the government. They exercise some part of the
sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status entirely
different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They
serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say
that they can strike is the equivalent of saying that they can
deny the authority of the government and contravene the
public welfare."
Central to this view is that, in accepting public employment,
the employee becomes enshrouded in the robes of the sover-
eign. It is the duty and ". . . should be the aim of every
employee of the government to do his or her part to make it
function as efficiently and economically as possible." 0 Because
in the daily course of performing his work the employee is both
bolstered and protected in his task by the very sovereignty that
he rebels against by striking, ". . . [t]he drastic remedy of the
organized strike to enforce the demands of the unions of
government employees is in direct contravention of this princi-
ple" 31 [sovereignty]. Indeed, under this theory the mere possi-
bility of the threat of a strike is incongruous to public employ-
ment as "the acceptance of a position involving the exercise of
some degree of sovereignty necessarily implies a surrender of
certain personal rights and privileges which, though properly
conduct of Government activities .... [A] strike of public employees
manifests ndthing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the
operations of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action,
looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to
support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther Steward, Aug. 16, 1937, in THE PuLuc
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLiN D. RoOSEVELT 325 (1941).
2 83 A.2d 482 (Conn. 1951).





exercisable in private employment, are in public employment
inconsistent with the public interest.""2
In recent years the sovereignty theory has fallen into dis-
favor as political leaders, as well as the judiciary, recognize it
as little more than self-serving rhetoric to rationalize the basic
assumptions upon which the theory is founded. Instead, a
public strike is no longer considered a serious threat to the
sovereignty of the government since "sovereignty" serves no
function other than as a political myth to preserve the existing
social structure." Judge DeBruler in his dissent in Anderson
Federation of Teachers v. School City of Anderson4 labelled
the term "sovereignty" as nothing more than a magical word
employed to justify the prevailing view; he further stated that
the government should not insulate itself against the pressures
of public employees by prohibiting public strikes.3 5
The strongest attack upon the sovereignty theory is that
the recognition of the right to strike would not work to destroy
the government's sovereignty. Instead, a recognition of public
employee's right to strike would involve only the release of a
small portion of its authority and sovereignty similar to the
government's waiver of immunity in tort and contract suits.
Certainly, from this relaxation of governmental power, the
government's sovereignty will not be jeopardized. In fact, the
example of tort and contract suits demonstrates that govern-
ment is capable of functioning after a release of a portion of its
sovereignty."
B. Structural Integrity Theory
Public employee strike prohibition has also been justified
as being necessary to preserve the present structure of our gov-
ernment. Proponents of this argument contend that public
employee strikes must be prohibited in order to contain within
City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 141 A.2d 624, 629 (R.I.
1958).
3 Kruger, The Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 455 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Kruger].
251 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. 1969).
" Id. at 20.
31 See generally ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-




the legislative branch the sole power and discretion regarding
the budget. In this regard a strike is seen as a mechanism
through which employees can dictate policy changes and finan-
cial priorities:
[o]ne of the vital interests of the public which should be
conserved in the government-employee relationship is the
ability of representative government to perform the function
of levying taxes and, through the budgeting of governmental
resources, of establishing priorities among the government
services desired by the body politic.37
To permit a strike would be intolerable since this would be the
result of a coercive delegation of the discretion which a public
board or public body must exercise in its fulfillment of its
duties.u
. . . [Tihe ability of the Legislature to establish priorities
among government services would be destroyed if public
employees could, with impunity, engage in strikes which de-
prive the public of essential services. The striking employees,
by paralyzing a city through the exercise of naked power,
could attain gains wholly disproportionate to the services ren-
dered by them and at the expense of the public and other
public employees. The consequences would be the destruc-
tion of democratic legislative processes because budgeting
and the establishment of priorities would no longer result
from the free choice of the electorate's representatives but
from the coervice effect of paralyzing strikes of public
employees.3'
Still, as with the sovereignty theory, this argument is not
totally persuasive. The resulting budgetary disruption could
easily be circumvented by the passage of regulations requiring
negotiations prior to any strike, prescribing time guidelines and
coupling the strike power with alternative conflict resolution
Taylor, supra note 7, at 619.
m City of Detroit v. Division 26, St. Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees, 51
N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1958); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, St. & Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio C.P., Cuyahoga County, 1949); See City of
Alcoa v. Local 760, EBEW, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1957); S. MAxmwsy, Epu'ovrz
RELATIONS IN STATE AND LocAL GovERNMmmT 38 (1971).




alternatives.4" The criticisms of this theory focus upon aspects
unique to public employee strikes and have been used to justify
the difference in policy between the private and public strike.4
C. Absence of Profit Motive
A further basis for the denial of the public employee's right
to strike has been the absence of the profit motive within the
government.42 Private enterprise's fundamental goal of profit
maximization is considered an adequate force to impede any
unreasonable concessions regarding wage and benefit demands
which striking private employees can exact. Conversely,
government employers are characterized as sufficiently benign
to make the use of an economic weapon unnecessary.43 How-
ever, this portrayal of the government employer is inaccurate.
In fact, the politically necessary desire to maintain a low
budget is the public employer's equivalent to profit maximiza-
tion. By maintaining a ceiling on the budget, the government
is able to keep a check on high salaries."
D. Preservation of Government
Public strike prohibition is also justified as being neces-
sary to preserve our system of government-a government of
law rather than contract. Under a government of law there is a
continuity of function, predictability in requirements and
rights, and equality of treatment among all people. To condone
public strikes is seen as a sanctioning of a government by con-
"0 Comment, Prohibition Revisited: The Strike Ban in Public Employment, 1969
Wis. L. REv. 930, 936 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Prohibition Revisited].
"1 Indicative are the comments of the New York Court in City of New York v. De
Lury, 243 N.E.2d 128, 134, 295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 909 (N.Y. 1968):
[t]he orderly functioning of our democratic form of representative govern-
ment and the preservation of the right of our representatives to make budget-
ary allocations-free from the compulsions of crippling strikes-require the
regulation of strikes by public employees whereas there is no similar counter-
vailing reason for a prohibition of strikes in the private sector.
42 Board of Educ. v. Redding, 207 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. 1965); City of Manchester v.
Manchester Teachers Guild, 131 A.2d 59 (N.H. 1957); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket
Teachers Alliance, 141 A.2d 624, 628 (R.I. 1958).
Comment, Prohibition Revisited, supra note 40, at 932.
" Id. at 936.
[Vol. 63
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tract and not law. 5 In this manner those desirable character-
istics of a smoothly functioning government just mentioned are
lost.
E. Essential Versus Non-Essential Services
Courts and commentators have frequently classified
strikes in terms of those affecting essential services and those
touching nonessential services. Generally, strikes are consid-
ered at least tolerable in the latter category and not at all
acceptable in the former. However, this distinction between
essential and non-essential services is not feasible. First, the
range of government services is too complex and includes too
many widely used essentials to support a principle of selectiv-
ity. Second, public opinion would not tolerate such fine distinc-
tions. Third, it is unreasonable to permit some government
employees to strike while denying the right to others." This
dichotomy also defeats the purpose behind the grant of the
right to strike for leverage and bargaining power of the employ-
ees. If such a distinction were made, only the non-essential
services would be permitted to strike, and by definition this
would prevent the pressure from affecting the employer since
only non-essential, less noticeable services would be involved.47
Moreover, consideration must be given to "the adverse psy-
chological impact an employing agency would create when it
tells certain groups of its employees that since they are 'non-
essential' they may strike."" Finally, "[t]he essentiality of
continued service does not require that the sole power of finally
determining the wage rate be left with the budget-oriented
government employer.""
F. Governmental Versus Proprietary Functions
Another distinction which once had considerable following
is that of the governmental versus proprietary functions of
government. Strikes were permitted in the latter category but
"Almond v. County of Sacramento, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
" Clark, supra note 13, at 116.
47 Anderson, supra note 17, at 951.
's ADvisoRy Comm'N, supra note 36, at 97.
" Comment, Prohibition Revisited, supra note 40, at 937.
19751
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were forbidden within the former. Today, however, courts have
generally discarded this dichotomy as being illogical and im-
material. 0
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In spite of the courts' hesitance and frequent refusal to
permit organization and collective bargaining among public
employees and the almost universal denial of the right to
strike, the utilization of these labor relations tools has in-
creased rapidly in recent years. Particularly, strikes have
grown in number, employee involvement, and duration." Of
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
210 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1949); City of Alcoa v. IBEW, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1957); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Harris County-Houston Channel Nay. Dist., 358
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1962); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 324
P.2d 1099 (Wash. 1958).
51
Work Stoppages Affecting Government Employees in
Administrations, Protection and Sanitation
Year Number Workers Involved Man-Days Idle
1956 27 3,460 11,100
1957 12 820 4,430
1958 15 1,720 7,510
1959 25 2,050 10,500
1960 36 28,600 58,400
1961 28 6,610 15,300
1962 28 31,100 79,100
1963 29 4,840 15,400
1964 41 22,700 70,800
1965 42 11,900 146,000
1966
State 9 3,090 6,010
Local 133 102,000 449,000
1967
State 12 4,670 16,300
Local 169 127,000 1,230,000
1968
State 16 9,300 42,800
Local 235 190,900 2,492,800
1969
Federal 2 600 1,100
State 37 20,500 152,400
Local 372 139,000 592,200
1970
Federal 3 158,800 648,300
State 23 8,800 44,600
Local 386 168,800 1,330,400
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course, the public has been tremendously affected by this rise;
drastic consequences of public strikes felt across the nation
dictated a serious investigation into the causes and remedies
of strikes. Soon the desperation of public employees, without
any alternative method to secure employer recognition and re-
sponsiveness to their grievances, was noted and recognized as
a significant contributive factor to strikes.5 2 As the penalties
against strikes proved futile, and it was learned that strikers
could benefit from breaking the law, there ". . . was a recogni-
tion. . . that there was a need for machinery into which em-
ployee unrest and dissatisfaction could be channeled, hopefully
to do away with the need for the resort to strike.""3 In addition
it was recognized that "[i]f the prevailing no-strike policy is
to be maintained, it must be demonstrated that on balance the
interest of public employees and the general community will be
better served by a process of political collective bargaining
based upon recommendations or upon voluntary or binding
arbitration rather than upon the economic coercion of a
strike."54
Finally, public officials began to realize that the key to the
elimination or, at least, substantial reduction in the use of
strikes is the development of a substitutional equivalent which
will most nearly achieve the benefits of the strike's leverage;55
that a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of the right to strike
must be provided before work stoppages will be effectively
eliminated. Neither the passage of legislation with severe pen-
alties nor the judicial decree with accompanying fines will end
strikes in the public sector. Unions involved in the public em-
1971
Federal 2 1,000 8,100
State 23 14,500 81,800
Local 304 137,100 811,500
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATmcS, DEP'T OF" LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
Tisrics 360-63 (1973).
" Bernstein, Beyond the Strike: A Proposal for Experimentation with Substitutes,
33 Omo ST. L.J. 781, 782 (1972).
u Zack, supra note 10, at 103.
Anderson, supra note 17, at 969 (emphasis original).




ployee sector locally will vigorously oppose any real reduction
in their strike power56 unless the abatement is accompanied by
material benefits. ". . .[T]he same unions, at a higher level,
will find it hard to resist the prospects of expansion into the
unorganized areas.
'57
From the insights and recognitions discussed above, stat-
utes and ordinances were enacted in numerous states, and a
new era of public employee labor relations has emerged.
The growing attention now being given to devising and revis-
ing discussion, negotiating, and impasse procedures reflects
in part a realization that the public employee has legitimate
grievances that should be aired and resolved. Yet, nothing
has done more to hasten the development of this procedural
machinery than the increasing tendency of public employees
to strike in order to obtain redress of their grievances."
The success of past strikes in accomplishing the desired reform
goes even beyond the immediate concessions in wages, hours,
benefits and working conditions. Today the thrust of the prior
strikes is felt through the impact upon public employer-
employee relations and the resulting statutorily prescribed
impasse resolution procedures. Too great a liberalization of the
strike ban in the past, and probably even today, would have
diverted attention from constructive alternatives to the strike
and stimulated the negative aspects of work stoppages. 9
Two states whose statutes exemplify the type of attractive
compromise that can result from the clash between strike-
prone public workers and the traditional no-strike philosophy
are Pennsylvania and Hawaii. There, legislation permits the
use of the strike following an unsuccessful attempt to resolve
the dispute through other impasse resolution procedures.
[B]y legalizing the strike after the required procedures are
followed, [Pennsylvania and Hawaii] have not only recog-
nized what had been occurring in any event illegally, but they
have forced employees into the dispute settlement procedures
" Even though strikes are illegal in most every jurisdiction, they are still a real
and vitally effective tool of unions despite their prohibition. Before unions will relin-
quish their power to strike, they must be afforded an equally productive substitute.
51 Lev, supra note 55, at 776.
m AviSoRy COMM'N, supra note 36, at 59.
51 Comment, Prohibition Revisited, supra note 40, at 932.
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as a prerequisite to striking and jolted recalcitrant employers
into more realistic bargaining with the awareness that the
strike might in fact occur. It could be argued, also, that by
making the strike a legal weapon they reduced the likelihood
of its use by those employees who, as others elsewhere, had
engaged in the strike, even though illegal, to prove that they
were not afraid to use it.
6°
These two states have made provision for the psychological
human elements of public employers and employees. This is
essential if the statues are to accomplish their goal of insuring
smoother, more stable and predictable relations between the
government and its employees.
A. Recognition
The statutes regulating public employer-employee
relations are quite varied in both their specificity and in the
general principles behind them. Ten states have no statutes
concerning public employment labor relations or collective bar-
gaining." This does not signify that there is no applicable law
to apply in these states but simply that there is an absence of
statutory law pertaining to the area. Twenty-eight states spe-
cifically guarantee the right of public employees to organize for
collective action and usually include various other rights and
regulations within these statutes. 2 Twenty-two states regulate
, Zack, supra note 10, at 121.
" Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and West Virginia have no statutes generally applicable to
public employees, nor are there provisions pertaining to specific occupational or profes-
sional groups.
62 The states guaranteeing the right to organize are: Alaska, AiAsKA STAT. § §
23.40.070-.260 (1972); California, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3527 (West Supp. 1974); Connect-
icut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468 (1973); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1302
(Supp. 1970); Hawaii, HAwAn Rav. STAT. § 89-3 (Supp. 1973); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 8 (1973); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4324 (Supp. 1973); Maine, ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 979-B, 963 (Supp. 1973); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160
(1957); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 2 (Supp. 1974); Michigan, MICH.
Comr. LAws ANN, § 423.209 (1967); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (Supp.
1974); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.510 (Supp. 1974); Montana, MONT. REV. CoDEs
ANN. § 59-1603 (Supp. 1974); Nebraska, NEB. Rav. STAT. § 48-837 (1973); Nevada, Nay.
Rav. STAT. § 288.140 (1973); New Hampshire, N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:2 (Supp.
1973); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1974); New York, N.Y. Civ.
SERv. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1973); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-03 (1972);
Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.662 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
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public employment relations in specific occupational and pro-
fessional groups. 3 Florida,"4 Georgia,65 Ohio,66 and Virginia 7
have provisions prohibiting strikes by public employees; how-
ever, these provisions are silent as to other rights and duties of
public workers. Alabama6 and North Carolina" prohibit public
employees from joining or participating in any trade union or
labor organization.
B. Impasse Resolution
A considerable number of these statutes provide impasse
resolution procedures. The details of the procedure vary from
1101.401 (Supp. 1974); Rhode Island, R.I.GE. LAws § 36-11-1 (Supp. 1973); South
Dakota, S.D. CODE § 3-18-2 (Supp. 1973); Texas, TEx. Rlv. Civ. STAT. art. 5154 C, §§
1-7 (1971); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903 (1972); Washington, WASH. Rav. CODE
ANN. § 41.56.040 (Supp. 1973); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (1974).
0 States which have regulations concerning public employment in certain profes-
sional fields are: Alabama, Firefighters: ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450 (Supp. 1973); Alaska,
Teachers: ALAsKA STAT. §§ 14.40.570-.580 (1971); California, Teachers: CAL. EDuc.
CODE § 13082 (1969); Delaware, Teachers: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 (Supp.
1970); Idaho, Firefighters: IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801 to 1811 (Supp. 1973) and Teachers:
IDAHO CODE §§ 33-1271 to 1276 (Supp. 1973); Illinois, Firefighters: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
24, § 10-3-8 to 11 (1962); Indiana, Teachers: IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 20, art. 7.5, §§ 1-4
(1973); Iowa, Firefighters: IowA CODE ANN. §§ 90.15-.27 (1972); Kansas, Teachers:
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5413 to 5424 (1972); Kentucky, Fireman: Ky. REv. STAT. §§
345.010-.130 (Supp. 1972); Montana, Teachers: MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 75-6115 to
6128 (1971); Nurses: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 41-2201 to 2209 (Supp. 1974); Ne-
braska, Teachers: NEB. Rlv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 836 (1968); New Hampshire, Police:
N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 105-B:1-14 (Supp. 1973); North Dakota, Teachers: N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 15-38.1-01 to 15 (1971); Oklahoma, Firefighters, Police and Teachers:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 548.1-.14 (Supp. 1974); Oregon, Nurses: ORE. RaV. STAT.
§§ 662.705-795 (1973); Pennsylvania, Firefighters and Police: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
217.1-.10 (Supp. 1974); Rhode Island, Firemen: R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.1-1 to 14
(1969) and Police: R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.2-1 to 14 (1969); and Teachers: R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to 16 (1969); South Dakota, Firefighters and Police: S.D.
CODE §§ 9-14A-1 to 22 (Supp. 1974); Texas, Firefighters and Police: TEx. Rav. Civ.
STAT. art 5154c-1, §§ 1-20 (Supp. 1974); Vermont, Teachers: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §
1982 (Supp. 1974); and Wyoming, Firefighters: Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to 273
(1967).
* FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965).
* GA. CODE Am. §§ 89-1301 to 1304 (1971).
'3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01 to .05 (Anderson 1973).
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-55 to 57 (1970).
ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 317(1)-(4) (1960).
'3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1965). This statute, which prohibits joining or partici-
pating in a labor organization, was held unconstitutional in Atkins v. City of Charlotte,
296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) as a violation of the first amendment right of free
association and the fourteenth amendment due process requirements.
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state to state and there often are vaiiations within each state
depending upon the nature of the occupation. Generally, the
laws establish voluntary rather than mandatory procedures to
be followed. Very often the triggering mechanism for an im-
passe resolution procedure is the request by one or both parties;
seldom does the state have the power to force one of its agencies
or sub-divisions or their employees to submit to the impasse
resolution procedure. Once invoked, the statutes typically
provide several different procedures designed to resolve the
impasse, including mediation, fact-finding, and final arbitra-
tion. 0 For example, sixteen states7 provide for mediation72 as
one of the methods to attempt a reconciliation of the parties.
Generally this is the initial step and is a means of settlement
which is available at all times throughout the impasse resolu-
tion procedure. Thirteen states73 include fact-finding74 as one of
See generally the statutes cited in notes 62-69 supra and notes 73, 75-76 infra.
7' Mediation is provided as one of the steps for impasse resolution in the following
states: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.190 (Supp. 1974); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 20
(1973); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4332 (Supp. 1973); Maine, ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 979-K, 965 (Supp. 1973); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9
(Supp. 1973); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 423.207 (1967); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 105.525 (Supp. 1974); Montana, MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN. § 59-1614 (Supp. 1974);
Nevada, Nav. Rav. STAT. § 288.190 (1973); New York, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 209
(McKinney 1973); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11-01 (1972); Oregon, ORE.
Rav. STAT. §§ 243.712, 662-785 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801
(Supp. 1974); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925, tit. 16, § 2007 (Supp. 1973);
Washington, WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.100 (1968); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.87 (1974).
71 Mediation is a procedure by which an outside party assists the two sides to reach
a voluntary settlement. In order to promote a settlement, the mediator may offer
suggestions of his own. M. FoRKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAw § 541 (2d ed. 1965).
" Fact-finding is one of the steps in impasse resolution in the following states:
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473 (1973); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 23 (1973);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4332 (Supp. 1973); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 965 (Supp. 1973); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9 (Supp. 1973);
Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-1614 (Supp. 1974); Nevada, Nnv. REv. STAT.
§ 288.200 (1973); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.722 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802 (Supp. 1974); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAwS § 36-11-8 (Supp.
1973); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 929, tit. 16, § 2007 (Supp. 1974); and Wiscon-
sin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.88, 111.70 (1974).
11 Fact-finding has been defined as:
a structured procedure involving a hearing, presentation of oral testimony,
submission of documentary evidence, oral evidence (and sometimes briefs),
and other characteristics of a judicial proceeding. The fact finder is expected
to make findings of fact based upon the evidence and to submit recommend-
1975]
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the steps in their impasse resolution procedure. The timing,
whether and when the finding of facts and recommendations
for resolution are publicized, and the effect of the findings and
recommendations, vary from state to state. Final and binding
arbitration is included as one of the stages in the procedure ii
nine states;75 however, it is almost always initiated by the re-
quest of both parties. When thus initiated, arbitration is ordi-
narily binding on the parties. Strikes are permitted in Hawaii,"
Oregon, 7  Pennsylvania 7 and Vermont 79 when the use of certain
specified procedures fails to produce an agreement. Alaska, on
the other hand, follows a traditional essential/non-essential
dichotomy of public services and allows strikes within certain
classes of employees."0
C. Federal Government
The federal government has historically restricted the
labor organization activities among its employees. Both the
NLRA and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
specifically excluded government employees from their cover-
age.81 Moreover, although Executive Order 10988 (Employee-
Management Cooperation in the Federal System) signed on
January 17, 1962, by President Kennedy gave federal employ-
ees the right to form, join or assist any employee organization,
the definition of "employee organization" contained therein
excluded labor groups asserting the right to strike against the
ations reflecting a considered judgment as to what the terms of a fair settle-
ment are.
D. WOLLEr & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 6:54 (1970).
11 Final and binding arbitration is one of the conflict resolution methods provided
for by: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1310 (Supp. 1970); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 22 (1973); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 979-K, 965 (Supp. 1973); Massachusetts,
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E § 8 (Supp. 1973); Montana, MONT. Rzv. CoDEs ANN. § 59-
1614 (Supp. 1974); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.742 (1973); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1101.805, 217.4, 217.7 (Supp. 1974); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 36-11-8,
28-9.4-13, 28-9.1-9, 28-9.3-12 (Supp. 1973); and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733
(Supp. 1973).
78 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1973).
" ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.276 (1973).
78 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1974).
11 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1974).
1 ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (Supp. 1972).
81 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970).
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United States government or to assist in any such strike
against the government.82 President Nixon's Executive Order
11491 (Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service),
effective October 29, 1969, was more extensive than that of
President Kennedy. It not only continued the provisions pro-
hibiting participation in employee organizations that asserted
the right to strike, but also provided that a labor organization
shall not call or engage in a strike, work stoppage or slowdown
or condone any such activity.83
During the effective period of both these Executive Orders,
two other federal statutes regulating federal employee strike
activity were also operative. One such statute prohibited any
individual who participates in a strike against the government
or who belongs to an organization that asserted the right to
strike against the government from accepting or holding a fed-
eral job in the United States Government or the District of
Columbia. 4 The other statute provided for a fine of not more
than $1000 or imprisonment for not more than one year and a
day, or both, for anyone violating the first statute."
V. STRIKE ALTERNATIVES
To proscribe strikes is very easy, but to accomplish the
goal of preventing the interruption of vital services is another
matter. As has been mentioned previously, strikes continue to
occur despite their illegality. The strike is still considered a
valuable and necessary tool by public employees and their
unions, because no other satisfactory and effective alternative
procedure has been implemented. The Lexington firemen's
two-hour strike was called because all available means to reach
a settlement had been employed without accomplishing the
desired result. Furthermore, there were no other procedures or
possible methods to achieve the demands of the firefighters;8
no procedure had been established in order to permit meaning-
ful discussion between the parties in the dispute. It must be
remembered that "[it is, however, the employees' right of
n Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962).
Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1969).
U 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1970).
"Lexington Herald, Aug. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
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effective participation which is central. The strike is only a
mechanism. Public employee rights of effective participation
should be made more effective, but the strike is not the mecha-
nism for doing so.""s Instead, a more effective system must be
developed. "Procedural mechanisms and the strike are differ-
ent means to the same end-improvement of the terms and
conditions of employment.""8 However, in order to gain accept-
ance of and reliance on alternative means to achieve this goal,
the methods and procedures developed must possess the same
essential characteristics that make the strike the successful
weapon that it is.
It is possible, though, that the strike might be acceptable
as the final step in a series of measures utilized to produce
settlement. If the impasse is first required to be submitted to
some sort of conflict resolution procedure, the chances of a
settlement will be improved. Public employees will invoke the
weapon with less frequency, its use likely being confined to
those serious disputes where either or both parties are unrea-
sonable in their demands. The reaction to a strike in such
circumstances will probably be far less severe, and public atti-
tude will be more tolerant and sympathetic. 9
To adequately consider the effectiveness of alternatives for
impasse settlement, the characteristics of a strike must be rec-
ognized. The strike is an economic weapon which places a cost
of disagreement on both parties to the dispute. It is a threat to
the employer in causing a reduction in the services he is ex-
pected and required to provide. To the employee, it signals a
lowering of his income and a period of limited financial re-
sources to provide his necessities. To each side of a labor dis-
pute the strike is thus a fearful tool and one which is to be
avoided when reasonably possible. This economic cost factor
" Taylor, supra note 7, at 619.
ADviSoRY COMM'N, supra note 36, at 97.
" George Taylor, Harnwell Professor of Industry, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, has stated that:
* . . a qualitative analysis of the strikes which have occurred suggests that
a sharp distinction is drawn by the public between strikes as an expression
of civil protest against patently unfair treatment and assertion of the right
to strike as a regular way of life, that is, as a recognized institutional form
for establishing employment terms.
Taylor, supra note 7, at 629.
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operates to bring the parties together in agreement so that the
negative consequences of a strike may be avoided. Therefore,
the strike works to resolve the impasse without the involvement
of a third party. Particularly, a strike is successful in establish-
ing the requisite atmosphere of urgency on the part of both
parties, which is so necessary to settlement.
With this as a background, it is possible to discuss several
basic considerations regarding impasse procedures within pub-
lic employment labor relations. First, vital public services are
essential and can be neither flippantly or frequently inter-
rupted. Second, collective bargaining cannot be meaningful
unless all the parties are faced with an economic pressure to
reach agreement. Third, a policy promoting sincere and good-
faith collective bargaining must be in effect within the jurisdic-
tion or else efforts at encouraging the parties to consult and
discuss will be futile. Also, of primary importance is the recog-
nition that the parties themselves should ultimately decide
upon all the contract provisions. After all, the parties must live
with the agreement and maintain an ongoing employer-
employee relationship. Neutrals or outsiders may play an im-
portant role in successful negotiations and resolutions, but it
is the parties who should make the final and binding decisions.
Fourth, any alternative dispute settlement procedure should
possess the flexibility for application to the many disparate
types of public employees. Finally, the procedure must be
workable and acceptable to the government employer, the
employees and the public. Not to be overlooked is the necessity
that the legislature accept the procedure, because whatever
conflict resolution method is chosen must, of course, be imple-
mented by that branch of government."
A. Mediation
Mediation is probably the most familiar impasse resolu-
tion method and is the most commonly designated statutory
procedure. Under this method a neutral third party, mutually
acceptable to the disputing parties, intervenes as a referee to
police the discussion and to foster its continuance. "The proper
" Brookshire and Holly, Resolving Bargaining Impasses Through Gradual Pres-
sure Strikes, 24 LAB. L.J. 662, 663 (1973).
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function of a mediator is to keep the parties talking and to
suggest possible solutions to those issues where the parties re-
main apart."'" One of the key characteristics of the mediation
process is the voluntary nature of both the submission of dis-
putes and acceptance of the mediator's suggestions or advice.
Seldom is the mediator given the power to settle the dispute if
the parties are unable to do so. This, of course, greatly weakens
the impact that the mediator can have on the disagreement,
often relegating him to a position of merely clarifying the issues
of the dispute. However, ". . . a mediator entrusted with a
power to determine the dispute, should the parties be unable
to agree, will find his persuasiveness multiplied to a remark-
able degree. '92 In addition, one should not underestimate the
importance of the mediator's role in promoting communication
since at times discussion between the parties often completely
ceases, making settlement impossible.
The task of the mediator is by no means an easy one to
fulfill. His goal is to bring about a resolution of the conflict, yet
he has no coercive powers with which to accomplish it. For this
reason, mediation frequently proves unsuccessful, and must be
followed by a further impasse-resolution step, such as fact-
finding. Moreover, the very availability of fact-finding or other
alternative procedures diminishes the likelihood of settlement
through mediation. 3 Finally, the nature of the mediation pro-
cess itself imposes obstacles for the mediator. He must seek,
"[b]y separate and joint meetings with the parties, presum-
ably maintaining the confidence of each side[,] .. .to expand
the area of agreement until all disputed items are resolved." 4
Seldom is he successful, however, because he is usually re-
quired to fulfill his responsibility in a limited number of meet-
ings, after which he is required to declare the dispute dead-
locked and ready for the next procedural step in the search for
a settlement. The crucial nature of the process dictates a
rapid settlement and often does not really allow for adequate
meetings with the parties, narrowing of conflicts and eventual
' Clark, supra note 13, at 117-18.
92 Lev, supra note 55, at 774 (emphasis added).
,3 Zack, supra note 10, at 112.
" Id. at 107.
' Id. at 109.
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convergence of thought. Thus, the subjects of dispute and the
potentially drastic consequences of a termination of vital serv-
ices prevent the mediation process from accomplishing the sig-
nificant goal of having the parties learn that they can best
resolve their disputes themselves without the heavy-handed
intervention of an individual external to the relationship and
the dispute."
A related drawback to mediation as an impasse resolution
procedure is the insufficient number of unbiased, qualified and
experienced mediators. This problem is particularly acute dur-
ing the time of greatest need, the budgeting period, when nu-
merous government agencies and departments within each
state require the services of a mediator.17 One suggested solu-
tion to this problem is that states establish their own mediation
services instead of relying upon the limited resources of the
American Arbitration Association. Under this proposal, the
mediators would be familiar with the special problems in the
locality and less time and expense would be required to inform
them of any distinctive features of a particular dispute." An-
other way to eliminate part of the excessive demand at peak
times would be to provide for the staggering of the budget
formulation process within states and among the various
states." This could ease the crunch, thereby permitting more
effective mediation. A further recommendation is that other
groups, such as civil service commissioners, could be utilized
as mediators, especially since they are well acquainted with the
working conditions and administrative framework of public
employment. This idea, however, has two major drawbacks.
First, it would probably discourage the use of mediation, since
employees often identify civil service commissioners with man-
agement. Additionally, it is likely that these same commission-
ers would be called upon to interpret the employment contract
or to hear appeals from employees who have been suspended
or discharged for strike action. 10
Unquestionably the greatest difficulty with mediation as
I* !d.
Id. at 111.
Cf. Lev, supra note 53.
" Zack, supra note 10, at 111.
'"C. SAso, COPING wrrH PUBLIc EMPLOYEE STRumS 34 (1970).
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a means to settle impasses between employers and employees
is arriving at a resolution which is acceptable to both sides. In
approaching a mediation problem and attempting to adjust the
balance between demands and offers, the mediator cannot be
arbitrary in his recommendations. His ". . . real objective is
to determine employee benefits and employer costs in the
framework of the employee's needs and the employer's finan-
cial position." ' To do this the mediator must consider numer-
ous factors, including the cost of living, the area's salary and
benefit structure for comparable work in the private sector, the
unemployment rate, economic projections and the "catch-up
costs" necessary to bring public employment in line with its
private counterpart. ' In light of these various considerations,
the mediator arrives at proposed solutions to break the im-
passe; having done so, his real task has only begun. He must
then persuade the governmental entity of the reasonableness
and fairness of the plan. This is true even where the proposed
solution would exhaust or exceed the money available.' 3 This
responsibility of the mediator, while not an active one, is none-
theless real, especially since ". . . when recommendations are
rejected by one side and accepted by the other, the dispute
usually becomes more difficult to settle. Positions become
frozen, and the likelihood of a serious impasse is increased.""04
Several factors weigh heavily against the likelihood of the
mediator formulating a universally acceptable proposal. First,
hostility between the parties often makes discussion almost
impossible. Second, the emotional embroilment of the parties
often renders them unable to alter their positions once they
have been stated. In addition, the inexperience or naivete of
the parties frequently results in the failure to respond to over-
tures and suggestions. Also, as alluded to above, the availabil-
ity of alternative procedures lessens the pressure for settlement
since the parties can maintain the hope of receiving a favorable
resolution later.' 5 Finally, sufficient costs are not imposed on
the parties to force them to bargain and discuss in a meaningful
,0, Lev, supra note 55, at 775.
,02 Id. at 7-75-76.
" Id. at 773.
"' Kheel, supra note 8, at 934.
105 Zack, supra note 10, at 106.
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manner. For this reason, mediation could be considered an
inadequate substitute for the strike, which generally involves
substantial costs to the disputants.1"
Although it would be difficult to remove all of these impe-
diments to successful mediation, it may be possible to lessen
or erase the impact of at least one of these-the cost element.
First, the parties could be required to pay the costs of the
service, thus encouraging quick settlement so as to decrease the
expense of settling the dispute."'7 Another suggestion, but one
which seems to involve inequities, is that penalties, such as
reduced federal aid or state allocation, be imposed if the parties
are unable to settle the dispute within a specific period." 8 This
would appear extremely unfair to the government employer
who feels compelled to settle within the designated time in
order to protect the integrity of his budget. Greater concessions
would be made in order to preserve the state aid, and a union
could relentlessly pursue its demands without the fear of reper-
cussions for either delay or unreasonableness.
Certainly, then, mediation is one possible alternative to
the strike that offers much needed relief from the chaotic con-
sequences that can evolve from a work stoppage. Indeed, this
procedure by its nature embodies several positive characteris-
tics for dispute settlement. Unfortunately, it is also shackled
by numerous shortcomings which render it but a questionably
effective substitute for the strike.
B. Fact-Finding
Fact-finding is a second, frequently used impasse-reso-
lution procedure. Under this method, the fact finder, who
might be a single individual or a committee, depending upon
the parties' selection or statutory requirements, plays a more
active role than the mediator. Instead of simply serving as a
neutral entity seeking to promote communication, the fact
finder:
... functions in a more judicial role, receiving in joint ses-
sion evidence from the parties in support of their respective
'"Herman, supra note 11, at 64.




positions, permitting examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, until he has collected sufficient evidence to pre-
pare a report of his findings and his recommendations for
settlement.'09
These findings and recommendations are the fact finder's only
weapons, since he lacks the power to force the parties to accept
his proposals;110 as in mediation, the parties are perfectly free
to accept or reject proposed solutions. For example,
[i]f the fact finder's report is favorable to the employer, it
may be embraced as the "fair judgment" of an impartial
outsider. If the recommendations do not satisfy the employer,
they may be rejected as "palpably inequitable," and the
character and bona fides of the fact finder may be attacked.
Ultimately in the tough cases. . a hard nosed employer will
prevail."'
It is for this reason that some larger labor organizations refuse
to use fact-finding, viewing it as a process that only delays
settlement. In contrast, unions see the strike as providing a
greater chance of obtaining their demands due to certain em-
ployer attitudes or expectations about the fact finder. 112 Thus,
it is apparent that fact-finding is not really a sufficient substi-
tute for the strike.
The predominate reason for this unfavorable employee at-
titude toward fact-finding is the parties' ability to reject the
recommendations without explanation. To overcome this
weakness it has been suggested that a show cause procedure be
instituted which would require a party rejecting a proposal to
give an explanation for the rejection."' This should overcome
the basic flaw in fact-finding and make it a much more attrac-
tive procedure to all concerned; forcing the recalcitrant party
to justify its refusal to follow the fact finder's recommendation
would almost certainly increase the frequency of settlement at
this stage of the dispute-resolution process. More importantly,
this proposal would still allow the final decision of settling the
"0 Id. at 107.
", Id. at 114.
Wollette, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in Punuc EMPLOYEE ORGANzA-
MON AND BARGARIG 34 (H. Anderson ed. 1968).
,.2 Krinsky, supra note 14, at 469.
"I Id. at 468.
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dispute to rest with the employer and the employee rather than
a disinterested third party.
The acceptability to the parties of recommendations is the
prime motivational force at play in fashioning the fact finder's
proposal. '14 Because of the desire to propose a mutually accept-
able recommendation, the fact finder often delves into what
has transpired at mediation in order to gauge what the parties
will tolerate." 5 This involves repetition and adds to the time
required for the procedure, which, in turn, increases the cost
of fact-finding and makes it less attractive.
Once a recommendation is made the discretionary author-
ity regarding when and whether to release it is a significant
power for the fact finder. The benefit of the procedure is for the
parties to have sufficient discussion upon the recommendation
before it is publicized. An ill-timed disclosure tends to freeze
the parties into their positions and prevents meaningful at-
tempts at resolution.1 6 The fact finder should have the final
decision regarding this matter since he is the most familiar
with both sides of the dispute and is in the best position to
evaluate the effect of publication on the parties' negotiations.
Fact-finding frequently is utilized so that the parties to a
dispute can argue that they have made a genuine attempt at
conflict resolution when in fact they have been negotiating in
bad faith. To foster a more serious effort at resolving the dis-
pute, it has been advanced that the parties should bear the cost
of fact-finding. This would lessen the excessive utilization of
the process and would also coerce the parties into greater ef-
forts for earlier settlement. 7 Moreover, the parties "should be
required as a condition of good faith bargaining to meet and act
on the recommendations." ' 8 Again, this would strengthen the
possibility of settlement and would require at least some dis-
cussion which could lead to settlement. Statutory procedures
regarding fact-finding vary considerably as to who bears the
cost and the degree of contact and negotiation between the
parties following the formulation of the recommendation."'
' Kheel, supra note 8, at 938.
"5 Zack, supra note 10, at 112.
' Id. at 117.
"7 Krinsky, supra note 14, at 467.
Its Id.
"I E.g., ORE. Bzv. STAT. § 243.722 (1973) (parties split cost); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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As an alternative to the strike in conflict resolution, fact-
finding leaves much to be desired. It does permit the parties
to make the ultimate decision on settlement but it also depends
upon the acceptability to the parties of the recommendation
and upon public reaction to the parties' failure to settle once
the recommendation is publicized. Like mediation, it does not
impose a sufficient economic cost upon the parties to require
genuine and good faith efforts at settlement. Finally, it is too
easy for one of the parties, especially the employee, to adopt
an immovable position at the bargaining table and exhaust the
statutory machinery in order to exercise its power of imposing
a unilaterial settlement. 2 '
C. Arbitration
Arbitration has received substantial support as an alterna-
tive impasse-resolution procedure. This method involves the
submission of the dispute to a neutral party who formulates a
plan for settling the unresolved problems in a manner which is
final and binding upon the parties. The arbitrator's goal is to
fashion his solution to fairly and justly balance the needs and
demands of the parties. The most significant aspect of this
procedure is the uncertainty of the outcome for the parties; in
this respect, it is a valid substitute for the strike. A substantial
cost is imposed upon each party for failing to reach prior agree-
ment due to the possibility of a less than satisfactory resolu-
tion. '2 Benefits are derived from the doubtful result since the
parties are forced to act sensibly, fairly and reasonably in sub-
mitting their proposals to the arbitrator lest he give the oppo-
nent its entire suggested award.2 2 Also, pressure is upon the
parties to resolve the dispute at an early date in order to avoid
the utilization of arbitration. 121 This is, of course, one of the
desired consequences of any impasse-resolution alternative.
Like the previously discussed procedures, however, arbi-
tration as a settlement mechanism is subject to criticism. A
43, § 1101.802(2) (Supp. 1974) (state pays one half of the cost and parties split the other
half).
120 Wollette, supra note 111, at 35.
1 Herman, supra note 11, at 64.
' S. MAKWLSKI, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS iN STATE AND LocAL GovauNMENT, 45 (1971).
'= Brookshire and Holly, supra note 90, at 664.
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chief argument against compulsory arbitration is that it does
not follow the concept that the terms and conditions of public
employment should be determined by the employer and em-
ployees who are directly affected.2 4 Arbitration imposes a solu-
tion by a third party, external to the continuing employment
relationship. Secondly, arbitration at times has a debilitating
impact on the bargaining process.125 This is particularly true
when one party, especially a union, is in a weak position and
has little to gain from negotiations.1 2 This effect is also felt
when a party is reluctant to alter its demands or compromise
during collective bargaining for fear of jeopardizing its stronger
position when arbitration begins.12 The use of arbitration is
also challenged as being a device which simply shifts the
decision-making process from one segment of government to
another, since the arbitration service is frequently a govern-
mental department or commission.12 Lastly, arbitration has
been attacked as encouraging the parties to adopt extreme
positions during collective bargaining, knowing that the dis-
pute will ultimately be submitted to an arbitrator and antici-
pating that a compromise solution will be proposed. 
12
The validity of the last criticism is hard to challenge. To
avoid the possibility of such inflated demands, "final-offer ar-
bitration" has been developed. This approach, often treated as
a separate alternative procedure, embodies many of the char-
acteristics of arbitration but differs in that the arbitrator is
bound to choose between the final offers made by each of the
parties. It is obvious that the parties will attempt to be as
reasonable as possible with the hope that their last proposal
will be adopted. 3 "Each side is bound to frame its last offer
in light of what it believes will be forthcoming from the other
side" 31 and what it feels the arbitrator will select as reasonable.
SWollette, supra note 111, at 35.
125 Id.
124 Bernstein, supra note 9, at 467.
In Wollette, supra note 111, at 35.
1In Id.
121 Note, National Emergency Disputes in the TransportationIndustry:AnAnaly-
sis of Final Offer Selection As A Solution to the Problem, 42 U. CiN. L. REV. 101, 110
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Note].




Through this process, the parties are forced to consider in good
faith the claims made by the opposition and to weigh the var-
ious disputed issues in order to arrive at a somewhat balanced
proposal. Certainly, each party realizes that the arbitrator can-
not accept a one-sided proposal if a more reasonable one is
submitted. The parties are thus encouraged to bargain ear-
nestly in order to narrow the number of issues in dispute and
to converge toward agreement as the settlement deadline draws
near. ' The general result is a movement toward reconciliation
and agreement, so that final-offer arbitration is capable of pre-
venting the divergence of positions which compulsory arbitra-
tion often promotes. '33
Nevertheless, final-offer arbitration is no panacea for the
arbitration process. First, it is commonly believed that final-
offer arbitration will not really drive the parties together. In-
stead each side will attempt to forecast what the selection
panel will deem most reasonable and then alter its position
only to the point that its offer will be selected. '34 Second, con-
sidering the number of issues which traditionally constitute an
impasse it is impossible for the arbitrator to select "the most
reasonable." ' 5 Likewise, it is often inequitable to choose one
proposed contract over the other.13 This is especially true if
both parties present unfair proposals and the arbitrator is
forced to choose the relatively more reasonable offer.137 Third,
compliance with the selected procedure would probably be
more difficult to secure since all of the provisions by necessity
would be from one party."' Certainly, the losing party would
be reluctant to abide by a decision in which none of its propo-
sals had been included. Finally, this procedure is based on an
,32 Note, supra note 129, at 116.
133 Id.
"I4 Id. at 117.
113 Zack, supra note 10, at 120.
' Note, supra note 129, at 120-22.
,' Herman, supra note 11, at 65. The parties, however, would have little room to
complain of this outcome as they could easily avoid the situation by submitting less
biased proposals. Still, it has been suggested that the arbitrator be permitted to reject
both proposals and require the submission of further offers. Of necessity, this would
involve delays in the settlement procedure and would lessen the positive aspects of the
final-offer remedy.
'38 Note, supra note 129, at 121.
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incorrect presumption that the proposal adopted is the best
solution to the dispute.139
Several other problems exist with arbitration and final-
offer arbitration which render them less than acceptable strike
substitutes. Foremost among these is that the success of arbi-
tration depends upon the legislature's delegation of its ultimate
authority to an arbitrator.1 0 This delegation of authority was
objectionable with regard to strikes, and while here it would be
made to an acceptable institution, it would probably not be
tolerated. If this delegation should be effected, the government
would not be at the complete mercy of the opposing parties and
arbitrator because in making a decision the arbitrator would
consider the government's financial condition and ability to
support the resolution.' Additionally, it is generally difficult
to select an arbitrator acceptable to both parties, as well as to
determine a standard to guide the arbitrator, should the parties
so desire.'
Despite the numerous criticisms of arbitration as an
impasse-resolution procedure, it should be noted that the pro-
cess can be particularly useful after other steps have been
employed. Thus, while containing objectionable qualities, arbi-
tration is still probably superior to a strike, with all its accom-
panying negative consequences.
D. Semi-Strike or Non-Stoppage Strike
The semi-strike or non-stoppage strike essentially is no
strike at all. It is, instead, an alternative procedure designed
to impose the costs of a strike upon the parties to an impasse
without a concomitant cessation of work. This method requires
that each week the employer pay a certain percentage of the
governmental unit's budget and the employees pay a compara-
ble percentage of their salaries into a special fund after the
onset of an impasse or the passing of the termination date of
an existing labor contract.4 3 Because the employees continue
" Brookshire and Holly, supra note 90, at 665.
" Makielski, supra note 122, at 47.
" Comment, Public Employees: No Right to Strike, 38 TENN. L. Rxv. 403, 422
(1971).
"I Comment, Prohibition Revisited, supra note 40, at 943.
1,3 Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L.
Rzv. 459, 470 (1971).
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to work their full number of hours, the government is able to
continue providing the vital services it performs. The benefit
of this procedure is that it places a financial burden on both
parties without harming the public through a cessation of ser-
vices and goods. The parties are each stimulated toward
reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement so that the eco-
nomic losses will be minimized. Of course, it is essential that
the funds diverted from each of the parties be utilized for a
purpose not normally supported by government and not benefi-
cial to the employees or else there would be no economic coer-
cion for settlement. This is, however, not an obstacle to imple-
mentation of the mechanism as there are various charities and
other worthwhile causes that could utilize the funds.
The strongest point in favor of this alternative is that it
would allow the legislature to maintain control of policy deter-
minations and budget allocation since it could reject any pro-
posal failing to properly consider governmental resources. In so
doing, the legislature would not be coerced into accepting an
agreement in order to achieve the resumption of essential ser-
vices."' The employee, however, might be slightly disfavored
by this proposal since he would be receiving less income but
would not have the additional leisure time that he has during
a strike. Of course, this factor would be more than offset by his
ability to maintain an income during the labor dispute. Also,
he could refrain from settlement until a satisfactory agreement
was reached, whereas during a strike the economic conse-
quences generally would force him to alter his demands in order
to return to work and earn income.
E. Income-Work Time Gradual Pressure Strike
The income-work time gradual pressure strike more closely
resembles a strike than does the semi-strike. This mechanism
provides for the employees to work a gradually reduced number
of hours each week following a bargaining impasse. The em-
ployee's salary would not be reduced in proportion to his de-
creased number of hours but would be less than full-time earn-
ings. Each week a greater percentage of the wages representing
the "unworked" hours would be withheld. This money saved
" Brookshire'and Holly, supra note 90, at 666.
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by the employer would be diverted to a charitable cause or a
government project not normally conducted.
Utilizing this mechanism the pressure to settle the dispute
would arise from several sources. For the employee, the gradual
decrease in wages would stimulate compromise. The govern-
ment's inability to adequately perform the vital services at the
optimum level would exert pressure on the employer to alter its
position. Finally, the public, dissatisfied with the less efficient
services received, would bring pressure to bear on both parties
to reach a rapid settlement.15 Once normal working conditions
are resumed it is essential that the time lost not be recouped
through the utilization of overtime. Otherwise, the coercive
effect of the reduced pay and services would be lessened.'46 This
procedure, as well as the semi-strike, would provide job secu-
rity for the employees since, unlike during a strike, they could
not be fired, fined, or placed on probation.'47
F. Arsenal of Weapons
The "arsenal of weapons" approach actually is not a dis-
tinct alternative. Instead it is a combination of the procedures
discussed above. When an impasse is reached during negotia-
tions, the parties must report to a neutral body which will
designate one or a combination of the above alternatives to be
utilized to resolve the dispute. The theory behind this method
is that "[t]he uncertainty as to what 'weapons' the impasse
could unlock might prove to be a far greater stimulus to mean-
ingful negotiations than would be the ready availability of
known machinery."' 48
VI. CONCLUSION
The public strike issue has emerged in recent years as one
of the most controversial and significant questions in labor
relations and government. Sparked by the recent upsurge in
"' Id. at 667.
'" Bernstein, supra note 143, at 471.
"7 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1303 (1971); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 150E, § 9A
(Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179-64 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Cirv. Sm~v. LAw 210
(McKinney 1973); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 411.03,411.05 (Anderson 1973); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.89 (1974).
1" Zack, supra note 10, at 120.
1975]
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
work stoppage among governmental employees, numerous
state legislatures have sought to institutionalize public em-
ployment relations by adopting regulatory statutes."' Most of
them, however, have maintained the traditional prohibition on
strikes among public employees. Unfortunately, this codifica-
tion of the anti-strike philosophy has not been accompanied by
a more persuasive rationale for its existence than was present
at common law. Instead, it is still argued that public strikes
cannot be tolerated because: (1) they threaten the sovereignty
of the government; (2) they prevent legislative control of the
budget and policy determination of the government; (3) they
permit public employees to exert a grossly disproportionate
degree of pressure in comparison to the services they perform
and (4) they undermine the basic principles of the democratic
form of government. Of the various reasons asserted for pro-
hibiting public-employee strikes, perhaps the most acceptable
one is that they affect goods and services vital to the mainte-
nance of social order and the protection of the public welfare.
Nevertheless, even assuming this to be true, it is question-
able whether it is fair and just to require public employees to
suffer under unfavorable working conditions and poor salaries
and benefits, while permitting their private counterparts, who
often provide the same sort of services, to improve their situa-
tion by striking.
Legislatures, in enacting the various statutes now in force,
cannot, however, be totally condemned. By far the greatest
percentage of those laws include alternative impasse resolution
procedures designed to balance the bargaining leverage of the
respective parties. It is, of course, a significant step for the
employees to be included in the contract formulation phase.
The disquieting fact, though, is that these alternative proce-
dures are not as effective as the strike in bringing about an
equalization of the parties' relative positions and therefore can-
not insure that the eventual contract terms will always be fair
and acceptable to the employee. Moreover, it is doubtful that
these alternative settlement mechanisms, designed to elimi-
"' Kentucky is among the states where this subject is undergoing current study.
See Walker, Public employees' right to bargain under study, Louisville Courier-
Journal, Nov. 12, 1974, § B, at 3, col. 5.
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nate the strike as a viable and productive economic weapon,
will necessarily have that effect.
The answer to the problem posed by the public strike is far
from simple. It appears that it is unrealistic to attempt to
legislate the strike out of existence in the public sector. Since
the strike is so frequently and successfully employed in the
private sector, it will remain (despite its illegality) a real possi-
bility to public employees in their struggle for improved work-
ing conditions. To outlaw the strike serves little purpose except
to promote a disregard for the law within public employees and
among those who are influenced by their actions. This particu-
larly rings true when teachers who are in a constant relation-
ship of guidance and education with children and when firemen
and policemen who so often serve as heroes to be emulated by
the young, flout the law and the authoritative institutions of
our society. The solution then is not to outlaw the strike but
to permit it as a final alternative when all other procedures
have failed. Since the strike imposes high costs on all parties
concerned-the employees, the government employers, and on
the public-its use as a tool of last resort could have a threaten-
ing and coercive effect capable of invoking compromise and
agreement. In this way, it would enhance the effectiveness of
the prior procedures for resolution and often avoid the need for
a strike at all.
Damon W. Harrison, Jr.
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